Geoffrey Hall

Publications

• Symmetry and Representation (with Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez)
  Philosophy Compass (Forthcoming).
  [Abstract : Preprint]

  It is often said in physics that if two models of a theory are related by a symmetry, then the two models provide (or could provide) two different representations of the very same situation, alike the case of two maps of different color and size for the very same city. It is also said that the situations represented by two models of a theory are indiscernible in some ways when the models in question are related by a symmetry of the theory, just like the situation in the interior of the cabin of a train when the train is at rest in the station is empirically indiscernible from the situation in the interior when the train is moving uniformly (in classical mechanics, these two situations are represented by two models related by a boost). In recent years, philosophers of physics have focused a lot of attention on developing various principles that aim to elucidate these and similar remarks on symmetries, models, physical equivalence, and representation that are widespread in physics practice. The goal of the current article is to provide a critical review of these principles, and suggest a new framework for thinking about these kinds of questions. One important upshot of the paper is that questions of indiscernibility, and questions of the representational capacity of models, must be distinguished from one another.

• Is Consciousness Vague?
  Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101 (3): 670-684 (2023).
  [Abstract : Preprint]

  This paper defends the view that 'phenomenal consciousness' could have borderline cases. There are a number argument in the literature that purport to establish the opposite view, that 'phenomenal consciousness' is precise. I argue that these arguments depend on principles that are inconsistent with plausible, and somewhat standard, principles about borderline cases.

• Naturalness is Not an Aim of Belief
  Erkenntnis, 88: 2277–2290 (2023).
  [Abstract : Preprint]

  Recently several authors have argued that structure or joint-carvingness is an aim of belief. This paper argues that this is false. In particular, I argue that our theorizing about naturalness is not itself guided by naturalness.

• Phenomenal Properties are Luminous Properties
  Synthese, 199: 11001–11022 (2021).
  [Abstract : Preprint]

  This paper defends the view that phenomenal properties are (consistent) luminous properties. On this view, if there is something that it is like to have some property, in the relevant sense, then it is a property one must always know oneself to have when one has it.

• Unity and Application
  Ergo, 8: 44 (2021).
  [Abstract : Preprint]

  Propositions represent the entities from which they are formed. This fact has puzzled philosophers and some have put forward radical proposals in order to explain it. This paper develops a primivitist account of the representational properties of propositions that centers on the operation of application. As we will see, this theory wins out over its competitors on grounds of strength, systematicity and unifying power.

• Indefinite Extensibility and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
  Philosophical Studies, 178 (2): 471-492 (2021).
  [Abstract : Preprint]

The principle of sufficient reason threatens modal collapse. Some have suggested that by appealing to the indefinite extensibility of contingent truth, the threat is neutralized. This paper argues that this is not so. If the indefinite extensibility of contingent truth is developed in an analogous fashion to the most promising models of the indefinite extensibility of the concept set, plausible principles permit the derivation of modal collapse.